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By drawing on Kideckel (2002) and Todorova and Gille (2010), the article seeks to (1) 
explore forms of workers’ new subalternetiy in the new, capitalist regimes in East Germany 
and Hungary (2) argue that nostalgia for the socialist regimes functions as a means and 
claim of the “little man” to express social criticism. Under state socialism workers 
constituted the emblematic class of the regime. After the collapse of the socialist regimes in 
Eastern Europe, workers faced the double challenges of the decline of the political weight and 
significance of the working class as well as the devaluation of production work in a 
postindustrial society.     
The essay analyzes the postsocialist experience of the East German and Hungarian  workers 
in three main dimensions (1) the experience of post-Fordist development in the factory (2) the 
subjective evaluation of the standard of living (3) interpersonal relations. Lastly, I examine 
the social and political attitudes of the workers in the mirror of their postsocialist experience. 
I argue that Hungarians had a more direct experience of peripheral development than the 
East Germans. While East Germany’s greater success of integration into the capitalist world 
economy was accompanied with a change of mentality and the appearance of post-
materialistic values, in Hungary nationalism seemed to be the only alternative to a capitalism, 
which disappointed and effectively impoverished many people. This explains the ambiguous 
evaluation of the socialist Kádár regime as the vision of greater social and material equality 
is confused with a longing for a strong state, order and an autocratic government. 
 
 
New capitalism and the socialist working class 
David Kideckel recalled his first trip to the Jiu Valley mining town in Romania with the 
observation that people to whom he told of his interest in labor, miner working conditions and 
the impact of unemployment, would ask him in return whether he was a Communist 
(Kideckel 2002). Later he goes on to argue that “the region’s problematic is not too slow a 
movement to capitalism (as »transition« would have it) but too fast; not too little capitalism 
but too much. Rather than postsocialist, it is better understood as »neo-capitalist«, a social 
system that reworks basic capitalist principles in new, even more inegalitarian ways than the 
Western model from which it derives. […] There have been some exceptions. Some joint 
ventures with enterprises of the developed capitalist world have given workers reasonable 
wages and job security. The dominant trends, however, have been to sanctify individualized 
ownership at the expense of social equity, to pursue inappropriate loan policies, and to 
facilitate a corrupt bargain between owning and political classes at the expense of labor. 
Industrial workers have fallen to near the bottom of the economic and social scale, there is 
still no effective middle class, and class boundaries are further solidified” (Kideckel, 2002, 
115). 1 
                                                 
1 This criticism is shared by Gowan (1995); Watson (1993); Amsden et al (1994); Slomczynski and Shabad 
(1997); Wedel (1998). From the Hungarian literature see also Huszár (2012; 2013).  
These observations show a remarkable similarity to the arguments of left-wing intellectuals in 
Hungary. Erzsébet Szalai, for instance, also prefers to call postsocialist societies as 
neocapitalist regimes2 while Nigel Swain, who conducted fieldwork in Hungary in the 1970s, 
and wrote a book of the socialist system as existed after the economic reforms (Swain 1992) 
speaks of postsocialist capitalism (Swain 2011) The reason for why I cited Kideckel at length 
is twofold. Firstly, it offers an explanation for the “blank spot” in the Hungarian (and indeed, 
in general in the East-Central European) literature covering working-class life under 
postsocialism. Secondly, while Kideckel is critical of transition theory3 (as it is clear from the 
citation), he, indeed, argues that anthropology can offer a panacea for the shortcomings of the 
great paradigms and the dominant (legitimating) narratives as constructed by the new 
capitalist elites of the region.  
As it is well known, the “working class” throughout the Soviet bloc was closely linked with 
the Marxist-Leninist legitimating ideology of the state socialist regimes. This ideology 
proclaimed the working class to be the ruling class, in whose name the Communist Parties of 
the region governed the working people, the party serving as the vanguard of the working 
class.4 The eventual and rapid collapse of Communist regimes across the region in 1989 
discredited the legitimizing narratives of official working-class histories; the events of the 
year disproved notions of a simple equivalence between class position and class 
consciousness characterized of dominant trends in Marxist thought. In 1989 many Western 
left-wing intellectuals hoped that the socialist working classes, after getting rid of the tutelage 
of the Communist parties, would be mobilized against the restoration of capitalism and 
establish a democratic socialism based on workers’ councils and self-governance.5 Of course, 
this expectation proved to be wrong, and there was little effective working-class resistance to 
the introduction of a capitalist economy.6 There was no country in Eastern Europe where 
workers supported any kind of democratic socialist alternative to the existing system. Nor was 
the East European political and intellectual climate favourable for revisiting working-class 
histories after the change of regimes: all forms of class theory were regarded as utterly 
discredited, and the working class was often uncritically associated with the state socialist 
past, as intellectual elites invested in futures based on “embourgeoisiement”, which 
downplayed the social and political roles of industrial workers (Burawoy 1992).  
After the change of regimes, anthropologists, indeed, argued that the working class became 
the new subaltern class (Kideckel 2002; 2008;  Buchowski 2001; Kalb 2009; Kalb and 
Halmai 2011). While sub-alternity was used by Rudolph Bahro (1977) to explain workers’ 
location at the bottom of a knowledge-based division of labor in socialism,7 the 
transformation of socialist political economies have deepened the subalternalization of labor. 
Kideckel (2002) identifies eight key factors, which explain renewed and reinvigorated worker 
subalternality and its social decline, out of which this article mainly builds on two: (1) the 
devaluation of industrial work and loss of symbolic capital due to the expansion of the 
                                                 
2 Szalai (2001; 2004a). On the unmaking of the Hungarian working class see Szalai 2004b, although it should be 
noted that she does not consider the working class to be a class under socialism (Szalai 1986).   
3 For a discussion of the terminology see: Verdery (1996); Snyder and Vachudova (1997); Hann (2002); 
Humphrey (2002); Verdery (2002); Bartha (2010).  
4 For a review of the Western left-wing critical discourses of the Soviet Union see: Linden (2007).  
5 Burawoy, for instance, expressed this hope of the Western left-wingers in Burawoy (1985). Burawoy and 
Lukács (1992) rethink the potential of a socialist turn in the region.  
6 In Hungary the organization of workers’ councils was a short-lived experiment. See: Szalai (1994); Nagy 
(2012). After the political failure of this project, the Eszmélet-kör and the journal Eszmélet sought to preserve 
this intellectual tradition, which goes back to thinkers such as György Lukács and István Mészáros.   
7 See also Konrád and Szelényi (1979). For a discussion of the internal stratification of labour under socialism 
see Kemény (1990); Héthy and Makó (1975).  
information society and globalized culture (2) the general dissolution of worker social 
networks, encouraging their loss of energy and physical incapacity. 
The loss of symbolic capital coincides with the economic processes of ‘transition’. Even 
though the working class was nowhere a ruling class, the Communist Parties held the large 
industrial working class to be their main social base and centered their social policy on this 
group. I argued elsewhere (Bartha 2013) that the standard-of-living-policy implemented in 
Honecker’s GDR and Kádár’s Hungary did, in fact, orient working-class consciousness 
towards a consumerism, which the socialist economies could not satisfy and had to finance 
their policies increasingly from loans (Steiner 2004; Földes 1995). Politically, however, the 
parties could not afford to reduce their outdated heavy industries – because it would have 
destroyed the very basis of their social support.    
After the change of regimes the new elites constructed a legitimating narrative in which 
workers had no place other than people, who are “lazy”, “unfit for a modern, capitalist 
society”, “lack the entrepreneurial spirit and initiative to set up their own business”, “expect 
the state to support them”. These stereotypes are far not limited to Hungary. Dominic Boyer 
(2006) argues that in East Germany several journalists told him that speaking critically of 
unified German society was something they were loath to do because such criticism was 
immediately taken by their Western colleagues as a lack of commitment to democracy and as 
a yearning for a return of the GDR. To illustrate the point of the essentially different rights of 
talking of the future and totality of a society, he cites a journalist, who complained that while 
it was natural of the West Germans to ask their “Ossi” counterparts, how they could have 
lived in such a totalitarian regime, they would not understand the reverse question: how can 
one live in a society, where so many people are unemployed or threatened with 
unemployment (Boyer 2006, 374) or where – as in the case of Hungary – sociologists showed 
the existence of a large underclass? (Ladányi 2012; Ferge 2012). Or take the example of 
Poland where Michal Buchowksi writes: “The voice of the powerless and the poor passes 
virtually unheard. They have to resort to radical methods if they want to articulate their 
interests. Then, however, they are described as uncouth and ignorant about the new deal. They 
are simply created as »new others« of transitions” (Buchowski 2001; 15).  
While it counts as a truism that the workers’ state – as it was understood from a left-wing, 
socialist perspective – was not realized anywhere in Eastern Europe, it is worth asking the 
reverse question: what has actually been realized? The clarification of this question would 
namely help us revisit the nostalgia for the Kádár regime in Hungary: we should not explain 
everything through comments such as “the workers are nostalgic for a regime where they did 
not have to work so hard” or where “they had a better position” nor with statements that 
nostalgia serves as a means through which the losers of the change of regimes seek to upgrade 
their self-esteem. Eastern European nostalgia (Ostalgie) has been a topic of recent discussions 
in order to explain the eventual disappointment of Eastern European citizens with the newly 
established, capitalist regimes.8 It cannot be the intention here to give a review of this 
literature; I just want to clarify my own position in the debate. I argue that the validity of the 
memories of the socialist past should not be dismissed as a mere nostalgia for a lost youth or 
for a time when workers were ranked higher in society than today. I cite here Frances Pine 
“When people evoked the »good« socialist past, they were not denying the corruption, the 
shortages, the queues and the endless intrusions and infringements of the state; rather, they 
were choosing to emphasize other aspects: economic security, full employment, universal 
healthcare and education” (Pine 2002, 111)  Working-class community life was recalled with 
a sense of loss in both the German and Hungarian interviews. While in East Germany we 
                                                 
8 See e g. Todorova and Gille (2010). See also Todorova’s introduction (Todorova 2010). 
cannot, of course, observe the growth of an underclass, the Hartz legislation introduced 
between 2003 and 2005 rendered the situation of the unemployed more difficult, and one can, 
indeed, observe the “ghettoization” of the formerly privileged Neubau (blocks of flats), where 
only the unemployed, the poor and the immigrants live today. Ostalgie can be thus understood 
as a conscious comparison between a however malfunctioning socialism and the hard 
everyday-life reality of neoliberal capitalism (Boyer 2010). I therefore underline that 
“Ostalgie” is not a discourse constructed by the losers of the change of regime; it is, 
essentially a way and claim to express social criticism.  
   
The data 
I examine workers’ everyday-life experience and collective memory of the change of regimes 
in East Germany and Hungary through life-history interviews that I collected in both countries 
between 2002 and 2004. I focus on the group, which was supposed to be the main beneficiary 
of the party’s policy towards labor in both countries: the skilled, urban, large industrial 
working class.9 I collected forty-forty life-history interviews in Carl Zeiss Jena and Rába in 
Győr, the two large factories, whose state socialist past I examined in the light of archival 
sources. There was an equal number of men and women among my interview partners and 
also of workers who could keep their jobs after the change of regimes (both factories survived 
the change with a radically reduced personnel) and those who were dismissed/retired. The 
majority of the interview partners were 38-60 year old at the time of interviewing. I namely 
looked for workers who had work experience under both regimes. The majority of them were 
skilled workers; however, I also interviewed foremen, white-collar workers and the retrained 
employees of the new service sector (mainly in the East German case). In some stories we can 
observe an upward social mobility: among the pensioners there were skilled workers, who 
were educated under state socialism and promoted to be engineers, production managers or 
economists; they, however, continued to have a working-class identity or they preserved their 
ties to the working class (therefore they wanted to be interviewed). During the quotation of 
the interviews I sought to preserve the individual language use of the speakers that I tried to 
give back in translation (although the majority of the German workers made a conscious 
effort to use “standard” German). In addition, I used forty other interviews conducted with 
Hungarian workers of the catering sector and the building industry in 201010, and ten 
interviews that I conducted in Halle with workers and foremen in 2014. 
 
“This market economy knocked us out” 
 
The immediate experience of the change of regimes was different in the two countries. In East 
Germany mass demonstrations indicated the collapse of the legitimation of the Honecker 
regime, while in Hungary the ruling Communist Party MSZMP (Magyar Szocialista 
Munkáspárt, Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party) agreed with the opposition about the 
holding of democratic elections.11 To contrast these two, essentially different experiences of 
the change of regimes (in the GDR people participated whereas in Hungary they felt that the 
negotiations were a “business” of the new elite), it is worth citing from an interview that I 
                                                 
9 Pittaway (2011; 2012) and Földes (1989) argue that the support of the urban, skilled, large industrial working 
class was crucial for Hungary’s Communist Parties.   
10 The interviews were used with the permission of András Tóth. 
11 The change of regime in Hungary has been referred to as ‘negotiated revolution’ or ‘constitutional 
revolution’. On the political history of the roundtable discussions (the negotiations among MSZMP and the new 
parties) see Bozóki (2000). For a study of the historical roots of the peaceful transition see. Tőkés (1996). For the 
GDR see: Maier (1997). 
conducted in an unusual “terrain” in East Germany with a Zeiss worker (Zeissianer), who had 
been imprisoned in the Honecker era for his oppositionist political activity. In the summer of 
1989 he left the GDR, and he found new employment in Münich as a transport worker. After 
suffering an injury, he lost his job and he failed to find a new one. At the time of interviewing 
he lived in a hostel for homeless people. This is how he recalled the socialist past in the light 
of his experience in the new, capitalist society:     
 
We were fifty people in the [oppositionist] group. We did not do big things: we published 
some posters and a journal in which we wrote that there is political repression in the GDR. 
In 1982 they [the Party] took the case very seriously, I was arrested and I spent six months 
in prison. When I was released, the organization had already been dissolved. There was no 
point to continue. I did not have any problem in the factory, I earned good money. What I 
did not like was that I could not have my own opinion. You could not say openly what you 
thought because there was a constant spying on you, even in the pub or within the factory.  
They [the Party] declared everything to be anti-state activity and subversion. ‘You [the 
Party] made a mistake’ – this was impossible to say. ‘The Party decides everything, without 
the Party the grass does not grow and people can’t breathe’ - this was the general attitude. 
People wanted to think for themselves, make suggestions, better things – no one listened. 
The Party is always right, you should not think, you should just do your work. They wanted 
to deprive people of their ability to think. People should just do their work and leave the 
serious things to the leadership. I don’t see a change in this. Those who are at the top don’t 
want people to think. Today I don’t see a really big difference between the two systems, 
socialism and capitalism.12 
 
Jan’s life-history is not a typical East German working-class career. The citation, however, 
reflects a crucial difference between the subjective evaluations of the two welfare 
dictatorships. In East Germany, no-one, including Jan, who lost his job and his home in the 
new regime, wanted Honecker’s state back. In the Hungarian interviews we meet a more 
ambiguous picture: the desire for greater social and material equality triggers a longing for a 
strong state, order and an autocratic government, which is expected to restore national pride, 
protect Hungarian industry and increase the standard of living of the working people – the 
latter being the most attractive “catchword” of the Kádár regime.13  
On the basis of the interviews I distinguished between three dimensions of postsocialist 
experience: (1) the world of labor (2) subjective evaluation of the standard of living and the 
level of integration into consumer society (3) interpersonal relations. The first dimension is 
divided to two different types of experience: half of the interviewees in both groups could 
experience transition in the factory, while the other half lost their jobs or were sent to early 
retirement. The transition to post-Fordism was an essentially different experience in the two 
countries.14 The Rába workers unanimously constructed “narratives of decline” about the 
postsocialist history of their factory: the managers decreased production, the new proprietors 
refused to invest in innovation and the technical development of the factory, and they made 
profit by selling the valuable estates of Rába and laying off the workers, who worked there for 
many years since the plants had been built by the legendary Communist manager, Ede 
                                                 
12 Citation from an interview conducted with Jan (52), an East German male production worker in a hostel for 
homeless people in Jena in 2004. He was a skilled worker in Zeiss until 1989; at the time of interviewing he was 
unemployed.  
13 See also Bartha (2011). 
14 For a criticism of post-Fordism see: Boltanski and Chiapello (2005).  
Horváth. Many workers argued that the proprietors intentionally destroyed production in 
order to make profit from the selling of the estates. Workers’ grievances were frequently 
translated into full-fledged conspiracy theories as we will see below. 
 
Because you can see that in the West the state protects the national enterprises. But 
look at the Wagon Factory.15 It was a profitable enterprise and now I think that there is 
a will to destroy it so that it can’t be a competitor. I can see through these practices. 
Győr had famous textile factories, all of them were sold to the competitor [Western] 
firms, and they were all closed or destroyed otherwise.16 
 
The above citation nicely illustrate how the workers’ grievances are translated into an 
ethnical-populist discourse, in which the ‘multinational” (Western) capital identified with the 
“traitor” domestic elite destroys Hungarian industry, thereby becoming responsible for the 
misery of the workers, who lose the secure existence, which was guaranteed under the Kádár 
regime. To stress the decline, many workers explicitly contrasted the glorious era of Rába 
under Ede Horváth, when Rába exported its products to the COMECON-countries and the 
United States and enjoyed wide press and media coverage as a successful socialist company 
with the “lean years” of the 1990s: 
 
In the old times it was an honor to work in the Wagon Factory. I was so proud when 
my father first took me here at the age of eighteen, and that I am going to work in the 
famous Wagon Factory… and now here I am [sigh]. And if they give me notice, I 
don’t know what I will do. Distributing newspapers, cleaning offices or flats… sadly, 
there is nothing else. And this is so frightening! In addition, I married late, my 
daughter has just started secondary school and my son will go to university next year. 
If we were only the two of us, my husband and me, it would not be so bad. But I have 
to support them, and both of them are excellent students, which is my biggest problem 
because both will go to university because I cannot let them go to work after 
secondary school.17   
 
The Hungarian workers unanimously argued that the history of their factory was that of a 
history of decline after 1989, which they blamed on the management at the local level, and on 
the multinational companies and the state’s failure to protect successful enterprises at the 
national level. Post-Fordist innovation and development was represented by Audi, which they 
experienced as the humiliation of their company: Audi, in fact, bought the giant hall, which 
Ede Horváth built with the purpose of bringing the production of motor cars back to Győr. 
Rába workers recalled bitterly that under Ede Horváth Rába was the main sponsor of the 
town: it built a stadium, and it could boast about a football team, a house of culture, a well-
equipped library, an orchestra, a choir and a dance group. After the change of regimes Audi 
became the main sponsor of Győr, which Rába workers held to be the unjust consequence of 
tax exemption (which they blamed on the government). 
                                                 
15 The local name of Rába. 
16 Citation from an interview conducted with Péter (49), a Hungarian male production worker in Rába in 2002. 
He was a skilled worker and a shop steward. 
17 Citation from an interview conducted with Judit (50), a Hungarian female production worker in Rába in 2002. 
She was a skilled worker, who finished secondary school. 
The Zeiss experience differed from the “narratives of decline” characteristic of the Rába 
workers. The company implemented massive lay-offs: the chairman of the enterprise council 
(Betriebsrat) estimated that around 16,000 people lost their jobs in the first few years after the 
Wende. The company mainly lost the young workforce because young skilled workers were 
expected to find new jobs in West Germany more easily than middle-aged family men. In 
1995 a further 600 workers had to be given notice.18 The Zeiss picture was, however, more 
ambiguous than the Hungarian experience. Workers in fact had positive experiences with the 
post-Fordist model of production because the new proprietor, the West German Zeiss 
modernized the plants, bought new machines and technology and made significant 
investments in the town of Jena. Workers reported improving working conditions 
(competitive salaries, the installation of air conditioning, new bathrooms and canteens, 
flexible working hours). They noted, however, that they had to work under greater stress and 
tension than in the old production regime. 
The “narratives of decline” are essentially missing from the East German interviews. The 
workers including a former party secretary who told me that he continued to hold himself to 
be a Communist did not mention such cases of corruption and the deception of the people in 
relation to privatization as the Hungarians. Instead, the East Germans explained the massive 
lay-offs through the collapse of the COMECON-market and the rise in the price of 
production. 
Unemployment was unmistakably the most negative experience that the East German 
interviewees had to face after the change of regimes. In contrast, this was a far less palpable 
fear and experience in Győr.19 The Hungarian interviewees thought that whoever wants to 
work can find “something” in Győr; indeed, anti-Roma attitudes were often justified with the 
reasoning that Roma people, who live from social security and child care allowance, could 
find employment if they really wanted to work. For the East German workers privatization 
was not associated with corruption, the decline of the company and the rise of a Western rival 
firm such as Audi in Győr. Unemployment was, however, a constant source of tension and 
fear with which all interviewees had to face either personally or through the fate of their 
relatives/partners/children. Long-term unemployment meant not only exclusion from the 
respected world of labor but also social isolation, which often led to severe psychological 
problems. Some interviewees even spoke of the clinical treatment and eventual suicide of 
their male partners, who were long-term unemployed. 
The worst aspect of unemployment was not the material decline (although this was, too, 
mentioned) but the loss of face in front of the people, which had very negative psychological 
consequences. The interviewees, who were affected by long-term unemployment, would often 
mention that their working relatives/friends/acquaintances refuse to believe that they can’t 
find work, and some even hold them to be lazy people, who live on social benefits. Many 
voluntarily chose to lock up themselves in order to spare the regretful comments. Those, who 
agreed to give me an interview, all said that they made a conscious effort not to fall into this 
trap: they used existing networks that were formed in the GDR or joined other communities 
(e.g. one female production worker did voluntary work for the trade union) and self-help 
                                                 
18 Information from an interview conducted with Thorsten (52), the chairperson of the enterprise council in Zeiss 
in 2003. He was a production worker before 1989, and a member of the Church opposition. He received a 
religious education, for which he was negatively discriminated at school, and was rejected admission to an art 
school, which he wanted to attend. One of his sisters immigrated to West Germany, which rendered him even 
more suspicious in the eyes of the authorities. After the Wende he became actively involved in the re-
organization of the trade union. 
19 Official unemployment was less than 5% in Győr at the time of interviewing, while it was twice as higher in 
Jena. 
groups (the son of one of the interviewees, who found no regular employment for many years, 
joined a group of unemployed people, who exchanged services).    
In the second dimension (subjective evaluation of the standard of living) we can also observe 
striking differences between the two groups. The overwhelming majority of the German 
interviewees reported improvement in their material conditions: those, who had work, spoke 
of material prosperity, which allowed them to build family houses, buy new cars and spend 
their vacation in exotic foreign countries while the unemployed positively mentioned the 
improvement of services and the supply of consumer goods. The Hungarian interviewees, on 
the contrary, held their material situation to be the continuation of the “narratives of decline”: 
they all reported stagnation or the decline of their standard of living, which they considered to 
be the most painful experience of the change of regimes. The Kádár regime was calculable: 
even though the urban skilled workers admitted that the regime held no great perspectives, 
there were realistic goals for them: an urban flat or a family house in the country, a car, a 
week-end plot and regular holidays. The new regime offered them no such perspectives; even 
those, who said that they could maintain their former standard of living, claimed that they no 
longer have to support their children but if they had to, they would have to content themselves 
with a poorer quality of life. Those, who had school-age children, bitterly spoke of the rise of 
the new material inequalities: 
 
My children are not demanding and they fully understand that we can’t afford as much 
as others. But I really feel guilty because they are left out of so many things … When 
there is a school excursion and we pick up my son, I always tell my husband: leave the 
car at the back of the car-park so that the other children won’t see that we have such an 
old car. 20 
 
In the research the overwhelming majority of the workers reported that they lived worse now 
than they had in the past. In order to make ends meet, many interviewees had to renounce 
such ‘luxuries’ as traveling, eating out in restaurants (let alone cheap ones) and maintaining a 
car. People, who lived in single income households, were in a particularly bad financial 
situation. They reported to have experienced the most radical decline. I interviewed a female 
skilled worker, who got divorced, and she provided for her three children from one wage in 
the Kádár regime until she met her second husband. At the time of interviewing she lived on 
disability pension. Her second husband was a technician in Rába and they raised one common 
child. After her illness, the family sold their urban flat and they moved to a nearby village, in 
the hope that life is cheaper there:  
 
In Győr we lived in a block of flats, heating was very expensive, and we thought that it 
will be cheaper to live in the country. We spent all our savings, and now we literally 
live from one wage to the next, believe it or not. We support only one child, we spend 
only on the basic necessities and here we are, because the wage is so low. My husband 
earns 100,000 HUF but after taxation he brings 70,000 home including the child-care 
allowance. And he is a leading technician. In the 1980s we lived much better and we 
had to support four children back then. We fed them, they went to school, and we 
could still maintain a car, buy a TV, video, other things. But now we can buy nothing.I 
think that the Kádár regime was much better for us than this system.21 Because it gave 
                                                 
20 Citation from an interview conducted with Judit (50), a Hungarian female production worker in Rába in 2002.  
21 Emphasis is mine. 
something also to the poor. There were not so great differences between people. 
Today, one-one and a half million people live in real misery in Hungary.22 
 
While the Hungarian interviewees unanimously held the working class to be the main loser of 
the change of regimes, the East Germans would rather criticize the crystallization of social 
hierarchies in the new regime. The unemployed mentioned that they were ‘second-class’ 
consumers in the German society because they could afford considerably less than their 
acquaintances with a job. However, while in Hungary many workers continued to measure the 
success of the government against the standard of living, the East Germans expressed no wish 
for the return of the Honecker regime. Not even Jan, who lost his job and his home in the new 
regime, considered ‘the workers’ state’ a viable alternative. In the East German case we can 
observe a gradual shift towards post-materialistic values: the unemployed Dora could have 
found a job in Hamburg but she decided to live in Jena because of the proximity of her 
friends; many workers called the attention to the new, environment-friendly technologies, 
which cleared the air of the town; many explicitly criticized consumption for consumption’s 
sake and some participated in self-help groups or did some other forms of voluntary work. In 
Hungary, the workers explicitly complained of the loss of existing networks; no-one 
mentioned voluntary work; and many Hungarian rural female workers expressed an explicit 
wish for the return of the Kádár regime, when their families had a safer and often better life. 
23In the Hungarian case material values continued to dominate political thinking. Since they 
saw no alternative value system to consumerism, the feeling of deprivation and frustration 
was prevalent among the interviewees. 
The perceived lack of social integration takes us to the third dimension (interpersonal 
relations). Here we can find a common criticism of a capitalist society, which can be 
explained through the shared experience in a system, which advocated more egalitarianism. 
Interviewees in both groups reported negative changes in interpersonal relations: working-
class communities were destroyed as a result of lay-offs and a fierce competition for jobs, 
people at the workplace are individualized and atomized, solidarity declined and everybody is 
focused only on himself/herself. People consciously reduce private contacts because they are 
afraid to open up themselves and display their weaknesses, which the others can use against 
them. German interviews used military terms to express the intensification of competition: 
they spoke of lonely fighters (Einzelkämpfer), two-third society (Zwei-Drittel Gesellschaft)24 
and racing society (Ellbogengesellschaft). Interviewees in both groups recalled the collegiality 
and intensive community life under socialism with a sense of loss: 
 
There was a great collegiality, which we could all feel at the festive occasions. On 
such occasions we all had to listen to the official political talks but then we drank 
together, danced, I actually played Western music and all the comrades were dancing 
and no one cared who is party member and who is not. This collegiality does not exist 
any more. Today I would rather speak of the freedom of race in society. Everybody 
pursues only his or her goals, and there is no solidarity. This was the advantage of the 
                                                 
22 Citation from an interview conducted with Éva (54), a Hungarian skilled female production worker in her 
house in 2004.  
23 Unemployment can, of course, redefine gender relations within a family (see: e.g. Pine 2002; Rudd 2006).  
24 The two-third society refers to a society, where two third of the population belongs to the middle or upper 
classes. In Germany it was argued that the two third would mean the employed while one third is condemned to 
live from social and unemployment benefits and/or black work. In Hungary the interviewees did not use this 
term; however, the citations suggest that they would have agreed with the concept of the reverse two-third 
society developed for postsocialist Eastern Europe: that two third of society fell out of the middle class.  
socialist system, and that’s why – you see, I am interested in politics – what the leftists 
say, finds resonance in the GDR. We are responsive because what they say, 
correspond to the values according to which we were socialized. Perhaps we are also 
corrupted [he laughs]25  
   
Alex was a retired entrepreneur, who worked as a production manager until the Wende, then 
he founded his own firm, which was successful for ten years, however, then, as he told me, 
his firm won an order for the parking of a huge area of land (the firm was engaged in 
gardening and planting trees): 
  
… and then all of a sudden, the chief entrepreneur, who contracted us, went bankrupt. 
That was pure capitalism as we learnt it at school. Marx…I am a kind of social 
democrat… that was pure capitalism. So, we got bankrupt. My wife earned well, she 
was a physiotherapist – she was also retrained – and this is how we survived.  
 
Alex was later employed as a trainer for gardeners and then he went into early retirement. In 
spite of his bad experience with capitalism, he does not want back the Honecker regime but he 
remained critical of unified Germany:   
 
We became die neue Bundesländer – the Sicily of Italy. The poorhouse of West 
Germany. Unemployment, no money, social problems that we did not have under the 
GDR… you don’t know the expression: the stupid who stayed? This is how the West 
Germans ridicule the East Germans. We don’t want the GDR back but we want them 
[the West Germans] to recognize our histories, our lives, our professional carriers, our 
families and our values. But the West refuses to do that. 
 
Dominic Boyer depicts a similar picture of West Germany denying that the time of the 
socialist other is synchronous with their own time.26 Hence, Boyer argues, the whole concept 
of Ostalgie is a symptom less of East German nostalgia than of West German utopia. Alex’s 
criticism of “the stupid other” is developed along the same lines as Boyer’s argument that the 
future-orientedness is “reserved” for West Germans; East Germans are put into their place 
with the charge of being “corrupted” by a totalitarian regime or even contemptuously labeled 
as “homo Sovieticus”.   
By far from wishing Honecker’s regime back, Alex later recalled his encounters with the Stasi 
with the observation that had the regime survived, he would have lost his position as a 
production manager because he was reported even at the eve of collapse to be critical of the 
GDR (he asked at a production conference that how to explain the mass escape of East 
German citizens with the opening of the Hungarian borders). He, however, argued – alongside 
with nearly all my German interview partners – that Nazism could not be compared to 
“actually existing” socialism because the original ideas that lay behind them were not 
comparable.   
As it is clear from Alex’s story, he tried to preserve East German community values and was 
also socially engaged in the Church and also in a music group. He admitted that as a capitalist 
                                                 
25 Citation from an interview conducted with Alex (65) in his home in 2014.    
26 See also Hann (2013). 
he was a failure (“I don’t have a family house because I cannot afford it”) but he declared 
himself to be satisfied with his life.     
While the Hungarians typically argued that their deteriorating material situation forced them 
to reduce social contacts (they could no longer afford restaurants, parties and common 
holidays),27 the East Germans like Alex explained the disintegration of the old communities 
through the fierce competition characteristic of the new regime. They argued that 
technological development renders part of society redundant, which creates a sharpened 
competition for jobs than what they experienced in the old regime. This results in an extensive 
individualization in society, the loss of the old collegial, communitarian spirit and more 
intensive fighting against the rivals at the workplace, the reduction of private contacts among 
colleagues, secrecy (to prevent that others benefit from individual knowledge) and 
atomization. Workers in both groups stressed that under the socialist regime people related 
differently to each other: communities were stronger and interpersonal relations were less 
directed towards profit-making, social advancement and material interest. More people were 
willing to work voluntarily and free for the community than under the new regime. The 
disintegration of workplace communities was thus an equally negative experience for both 
groups – it is not accidental that this was the dimension, which triggered the most similar 
criticism of the new regime. 
As the above comparison shows, the structural differences between the two countries 
essentially shaped the everyday experience of postsocialist change. The peripheral experience 
of post-Fordism in Hungary was reflected in the workers’ construction of the ‘narratives of 
decline’, which blame the failure of catching-up development on external factors, and 
frequently follow the logic of conspiracy theories. The essentially similar critique of the new 
regime developed in the third dimension, however, suggests that the workers had a shared 
human experience under socialism, which they recalled with a sense of loss. This experience 
was voiced similarly by the workers of the two groups albeit their fears differed: Hungarians 
were mainly afraid of the material decline while the East Germans’ greatest fear was 
unemployment. This experience, however, did not discredit the new regime in the eyes of the 
East German workers as much as what was the case in Hungary. Hungarian interviewees had 
no direct experience of the change of the political regime: none participated at 
demonstrations, and many maintained a distance from 1989: ‘It was not important for me to 
have a say in politics. I don’t want to embellish the truth but for me this [free elections] were 
not so important. If I want to be honest, I had my secure existence, I lived my life and we 
raised our children. I achieved everything, which was possible at my level.28 For me it was not 
the most important in what kind of issues I should have a say. I worked 12 hours a day. I also 
worked during the weekends. This is my honest answer to you.’29 
While the East Germans identified themselves with the Wende (either because they did not 
like Honecker’s dictatorship or because they supported German unification or both) the 
Hungarians did not feel that it was their change of regimes. For the majority, it was the 
“business” of the elite and as disappointment grew with the worsening of their material 
situation, so did people lose trust in the democratic institutions, which were believed to breed 
corruption, the rule of the rich over the poor and dishonest and deceitful practices with which 
everybody associated privatization: 
 
                                                 
27 Utasi conducted a nation-wide survey in Hungary, from which she concluded that the poorer classes can only 
count on their immediate families and that the social trust is very low in Hungary. See: Utasi (2008).  
28 Emphasis is mine. 
29 Citation from an interview conducted with Péter (49), a Hungarian male production worker in Rába in 2002. 
I don’t know what people profited from 1989. I had a more relaxed life under 
socialism, and I think that the majority of Hungarian people lived better under the 
Kádár regime [than they live today]. When this democracy came in, they sold 
everything that was movable in this country. I think that it is a horrible sin to privatize 
hospitals, the electronic and gas industries, the ambulance because the new proprietors 
will rob the working people of all their savings and property. We learnt this in the 
Party school and it is true. Today’s Hungary is ruled by plundering capitalism. There 
are no regulations, no law and no respect for morality. Everybody steals as much as he 
can.30  
 
Those who harbored left-wing sympathies were strongly opposed to privatization. However, 
those, who declared themselves to be ‘committed’ anti-Communists, had an equally negative 
opinion of privatization and the working of capitalism – the only exception being that they 
blamed the malfunctioning of Hungarian capitalism on the Communist functionaries, who in 
their opinion continued to govern the country:   
 
It was the dream of my youth to be self-employed, in today’s term: entrepreneur. But I 
hate this new term because it can be applied for practically anything today. No one 
respects individual skills or good craftsmanship. If I have money, I can open a 
restaurant, a beauty salon or a pharmacy. But it does not mean that I know something 
of the trade or the profession. If you have money, you don’t need to know anything 
and you just employ people who know the business. But I would never equate this 
with the entrepreneurs of the past, who mastered their profession. I think that 
entrepreneurship underwent a huge dilution. Those who work hard are downgraded in 
this system. The only thing that matters is how you can sell things – no one is 
interested in the quality. It is a very superficial system, with very superficial values, 
this is my opinion.31 
 
Based on his ethnographic research conducted with artists and Orthodox Christians in 
contemporary Moscow, Zigon (2009) observes that hope can function as a temporal 
orientation of intentional ethical action in moments of what he calls a moral breakdown. I 
argue that in these moments people can choose to build their own dignity on a moral 
superiority which they consciously contrast with the elite-propagated system of values they 
perceive to be superficial or outright lies.  The calculable and socially secure socialist past 
was frequently contrasted with today’s “plundering capitalism”: workers drew a sharp line 
between those, who shared the old values of the significance and prestige of physical work 
and those, who rejected these values and benefited from the new regime, often through 
dishonest means: 
                                                 
30 Citation from an interview conducted with Tibor (67), a retired male manager in his house in 2004. He started 
his career as a skilled worker in Rába and he obtained his degree in adult education. 
31 Citation from an interview conducted with Miklós (51), a male self-employed plumber in his house in 2004. 
He started his career as a skilled worker in Rába, and he also spent two years in the Soviet Union as a guest 
worker, which was a good ‘business’ because the workers earned very well. As he proudly said, he could thank 
this only to his good work because he was never a member of the Party, and he disliked communists (his father 
was a peasant, whose land was nationalized and he never forgave this the communists). Miklós became self-
employed in 1981; in the 1990s he expanded his business but he could not bear the stress and after an operation 
he gave up his business, and he accepted a job as a maintenance man. He also worked black to secure a ‘normal’ 
income. 
 “Plundering capitalism…the Communist gang, which was close to the fire, gained 
fortunes after the change of regimes. Everybody knows this, and it is a different 
question that the newspaper Kisalföld is silent on these issues. He [the manager] 
bought two dredgers, which the factory bought for 100,000 HUF but he could buy 
them for 5,000 HUF when the unit was privatized. Nine out of ten enterprises were 
created this way in this country. I ask you: what is the difference between socialism 
and the today’s system? What was advocated after 1945 – that everything belongs to 
the working people… now I ask you where is that property? Either it was sold to 
foreigners or it went to the bank account of such Hungarian businessmen. I mean also 
the management of this factory who are stealing the last pennies from the workers – 
here is the property!”32 
 
We can observe in these interviews that Hungarian workers frequently constructed moral 
boundaries to separate the dishonest, exploiting “them” from “us”. Privatization was 
perceived as the means of the dispossession of the working people, who spent their whole life 
in the factory. The devaluation of their work and symbolic capital in the new, capitalist 
regime was connected with this feeling of dispossession and deprivation; their way of 
resistance was the assertion of a moral superiority, which functioned as a means of 
constructing an alternative discourse where the disturbed moral order would be restored.33 
This explains the apparent paradox that while there was a widespread nostalgia for the social 
security under the Kádár regime, the post Communist elite was held to be “inherently” corrupt 
and immoral. Political catchwords such as the restoration of a moral order would therefore 
find resonance among my interview partners.    
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Ost (2005) develops the argument that in Poland the liberal intellectuals betrayed the alliance 
with the working class, which had been formed in the Solidarity movement and in response 
the disappointed workers chose to vote for the right or the extreme right, which promised 
them the restoration of national pride and the protection of the interests of the “little man”. In 
the Hungarian case we can’t speak of an alliance between the workers and the intellectuals 
after 1956; my research concludes that workers were not familiar with concepts of self-
governance and self-management developed by left-wing intellectuals, who were critical of 
state socialism, and many interviewees did not consider free parliamentary elections as 
something that were very important for their life or their identity. The corruption, which they 
directly experienced with privatization, greatly undermined the credibility of democratic 
institutions and market economy, which instead of the promised and expected prosperity only 
gave them stagnating or outright declining  standard of living and the experience of a 
sharpening material inequality between the workers and the new, bourgeois classes 
(managers, bankers, lawyers, doctors and businessmen – in other words, those who can be 
seen as the winners of the change of regimes). Like their Polish counterparts, many Hungarian 
workers were susceptible to nationalistic-populist “catchwords”, which operate with a 
concrete enemy picture: “foreign”, exploiting capital, multinational enterprises, which take 
the profit out of the country, etc. The feeling of ressentiment was intensified by the 
                                                 
32 Interview with Miklós (51), a Hungarian male building entrepreneur in his house in 2003.  
33 See also Bartha (2004). 
“conspicuous consumption” of the new elite, which rendered their impoverishment all the 
more visible. The reasoning that this was possible because of the weakness of the state found 
many receptive ears: workers argued that a strong government was needed, which takes a firm 
stance against global capital. 
It can’t be said that the East Germans were not critical of the new democracy. They, however, 
made mo difference (as did the Hungarians) between Western capitalism, globalization and 
‘national’ capitalism. Neither did they hold the uniformly rejected Honecker regime to be a 
special East German path towards modernity. They counted such institutions and social 
practices to the positive heritage of the GDR, which can be easily incorporated into the new 
left-wing ideologies: socially responsible thinking, the strengthening of communities, more 
social solidarity and the increase of reciprocity in social life. This East German “identity” – if 
we understand it as open towards communitarian values and less consumption-oriented than 
the more materialistic West, which is best described in Alex’s story – can be easily reconciled 
with a post-materialistic value system, which stands in direct opposition to the materialistic 
Honecker regime. Therefore many interviewees declared themselves to “be in agreement” 
(einverstanden) with such political “catchwords” as environmental consciousness, sustainable 
development and greater social responsibility. The East Germans did not criticize 
globalization; on the contrary, many workers thought that the multinational companies 
established new jobs, and they brought capital and innovation to Jena. They had a positive 
attitude towards the multiculturalism of university life and they positively spoke of the 
appearance of foreign students in Jena;34 some criticized only the Deutschrussen (ethnic 
Germans, who lived in the ex Soviet-Union, and were given German citizenship).35 Anti-
Fascist education played an important role in the political and social thinking of this age 
group: they all argued that war is the most horrible experience that humankind should avoid at 
any price (the overwhelming majority was born after the Second World War) and even the 
committed anti-Communists refused to compare the Nazi dictatorship with the Honecker 
regime because the former was held to be a lot more monstrous.  
Opinions of West Germany varied across the interviewed group but in general, the East 
Germans were more conscious of the nature of peripheral capitalism than the Hungarians. 
Many admitted that before the Wende they felt inferior to West Germans because they were 
strongly influenced by the stereotypical representation of capitalism (Western workers are 
more educated, more creative, more diligent and more motivated than the Eastern workers of 
the state-owned enterprises, who were held to be less disciplined and “brainwashed” in the 
West).36 The postsocialist years modified these stereotypes as East Germans grew more 
critical of capitalism: they said that albeit their technology was not as advanced as the West 
German, their skills were comparable, and in fact they had to be more creative than the West 
Germans because of the technological deficiencies (one example that they mentioned: if a 
machine went wrong, they had to be able to fix it while the West Germans called a 
maintenance man). The majority was skeptical of the prospects of catching up with West 
Germany: they estimated that leveling would take at least 20-30 years. While they were 
                                                 
34 Jena has a famous university, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, which accepted many ERASMUS-exchange 
students and other students from all over the world. 
35 The East German interview partners all knew prior to the interview that they would talk to a Hungarian citizen. 
Therefore, those, who held strongly nationalistic views, were unlikely to have participated in the research.  
36 Concerning this topic, some interview partners explicitly told me that they would not give an interview to a 
West German researcher because of the mutual stereotypes. In this respect, it was an advantage that I also came 
from a socialist country; further, Hungary was held to be a ‘friendly’ and politically ‘liberal’ country, where East 
Germans could meet their West German relatives. The ‘liberalism’ of the Hungarian Communist Party was 
observed by the SED functionaries as well.  
familiar with the terms Wessi/Ossi,37 they argued that this distinction would disappear in their 
children’s generation. 
While the East Germans could, however, reconcile the socialist values, which “they learnt at 
school” with the values propagated by the left-wing parties, in the Hungarian case, workers 
could only construct moral boundaries between the corrupt, immoral, exploiting “them” and 
“us”, which proved to be an attractive catchword for the emerging nationalist-populist 
discourse. The results help us to explain the ambiguous evaluation of the Kádár-regime. The 
vision of greater social and material equality is confused with a longing for a strong state, 
order and an autocratic government, which we can observe in many interviews. While the 
German interviewees identified with the Wende (if not all of them with the German 
unification) and not even the unemployed wanted Honecker’ state back, only few Hungarians 
thought that they profited from the change of regimes and the newly established democracy. 
Thanks to their negative experiences, which triggered the above described “narratives of 
decline”, the majority was opposed to “Western” capitalism and they thought that a stronger 
state and a distinctive Hungarian path towards modernity would offer a panacea for the sores 
of peripheral development. While East Germany’s greater success of integration into the 
capitalist world economy was accompanied with a change of mentality and the appearance of 
post-materialistic values, in Hungary nationalism seemed to be the only alternative to a 
capitalism, which disappointed and effectively impoverished many people. 
Since it is a qualitative research, I have to be very careful with my conclusion since I don’t 
have (enough) dependent variables. However, as I tried to show on the basis of this small 
sample, working-class subalternity and the effective devaluation of workers’ symbolic capital 
can channel working-class anger and frustration into a nationalist-populist discourse, which 
operates with catchwords such as moral and Christian superiority, freedom fight against the 
EU and IMF, strong state and the punishment of the corrupt ex-Communist elite. In East 
Germany, there was a strong perception among the interviewees that the observed anomalies 
of capitalism can be explained through structural reasons. “This is the system” – was 
frequently concluded during the interviews. While Hungarian workers also expressed strong 
doubts about the change of regimes, these doubts, however, failed to translate into a criticism 
of capitalism. Instead, workers spoke of a “plundering” capitalism (capitalism distorted by the 
expansion of global capital or by a corrupt and trustworthy (post)Communist elite) and they 
typically expected the State to act as a mediator between the interests of multinational and 
domestic companies and between the interests of the workers and capitalists.  
Above I argued that nostalgia for the socialist regimes can be understood as a means and 
indeed, claim of the working people to express their social criticism. In the absence of an 
alternative (class-based) ideology, this criticism, as we have seen, could be easily channeled 
into a nationalist-populist discourse. It would be, however, utterly wrong to disregard 
working-class opinions and narratives as the manifestations of a “Soviet habitus”. One can, 
indeed, rather ask a different question: instead of blaming the workers, should not we blame 
rather the very intellectual and cultural context, which renders it impossible for them to 
otherwise express any criticism? In East Germany, the political left has a much more powerful 
public presence and media coverage than in Hungary, which can be one explanation for the 
different outcomes in the two countries. Workers have a claim for the re-valuation of their 
symbolic capital; if working-class histories are to be altogether forgotten as relics of a failed 
regime, one may not wonder that the outcome will be the rise of (new) ethnic communities.   
 
 
                                                 
37 Pejorative distinction between the West and East Germans.  
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